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Abstract 
While deficits in metacognition, or the ability to notice and reflect upon mental states has 
been observed in schizophrenia and linked with poorer concurrent and future function, it is 
unknown whether these deficits are unique to schizophrenia. Accordingly, this study assessed 
metacognition using the Metacognitive Assessment Scale–Abbreviated (MAS-A) and the 
Metacognitions Questionnaire– 30 (MCQ-30) among 26 adults with schizophrenia, 23 with 
bipolar disorder and 23 healthy controls. Symptom levels of the psychiatric groups were assessed 
with the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale. ANCOVA controlling for age and education revealed 
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that the schizophrenia group had lower scores on the MAS-A total and its subscales compared to 
the bipolar group and healthy controls. The bipolar disorder group also had lower MAS-A scores 
than the healthy control group. No group differences were found for the MCQ-30. Examination 
of symptom correlates revealed MAS-A scores were most commonly related to negative 
symptoms in both clinical groups. The total score and need for control subscale of MCQ-30 was 
related to total symptomatology and positive symptoms in patients with bipolar disorder. 
Correlations between the two measures of metacognition revealed that higher MAS-A scores 
were significantly related to lower scores on the Need to Control Thoughts MCQ-30 subscale.  
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1. Introduction 
The ability to think about mental states has been referred to as metacognition for over 40 
years (Flavel, 1978). As research on metacognition has expanded, the construct has come to 
encompass a spectrum of activities which range from noticing discrete thoughts, wishes and 
feelings, being aware of attentional biases and ultimately integrating these phenomena into a 
more complex sense of oneself and others which is needed to negotiate psychosocial challenges 
(Semerari et al., 2003; Lysaker et al., 2013). Recently, metacognitive deficits have been seen as 
playing an important role in outcome in schizophrenia. Metacognitive deficits have been 
observed in schizophrenia in all phases of the disorder (Lysaker et al., 2014; Vohs et al., 2014; 
Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015; Masse and Lecomte, 2015; MacBeth et al., 2016;) and are linked to 
poorer outcomes. For example, deficits in the ability to form and use complex representations of 
self and others has been found to predict poorer levels of daily functioning (Snethen et al., 2014; 
Bo et al., 2015), anhedonia in the absence of depression (Buck et al., 2014), lesser levels of 
subjective recovery (Kukla et al., 2014), prospective assessments of psychosocial functioning 
(Lysaker et al., 2010), intrinsic motivation (Luther et al., 2016), and negative symptoms 
(McLeod et al., 2014; Lysaker et al., 2015a). From another perspective (Wells, 2000), 
dysfunctional  metacognitive beliefs have also been reported in schizophrenia. These include 
negative appraisals about the benefit of becoming involved in cognitive activities and heightened 
anticipation of  the uncontrollability, and danger of thoughts (Sellers et al., 2016) and have been 
associated with positive symptoms (Baker and Morrison, 1998; Morrison et al., 2011), especially 
hallucinations (Varese et al., 2011; Hill et al., 2012; Austin et al., 2015).  
While these studies regarding metacognition have offered promising insights into 
understanding the unique challenges of schizophrenia, less is known about how unique these 
  
 
deficits are to schizophrenia as opposed to being a general feature of serious mental illness. For 
example, it is unclear whether persons with schizophrenia have similar versus dissimilar 
problems with metacognition compared to other common kinds of disabling psychotic conditions 
such as bipolar disorder. Several studies have found that patients with bipolar disorder have 
deficits in the ability to think about the mental states of others (Wolf et al., 2010; Martino et al., 
2011; Benito et al., 2013; Temmerman et al., 2015; Santos et al., in press). Two recent meta-
analyses have indeed found that compared to non-psychiatric controls, patients with bipolar 
disorder have deficits in the abilities to recognize both motive and affective states in others 
(Samamé et al., 2015) and that these deficits are not merely a function of mood state (Bora et al., 
2016). Of note, one recent longitudinal study has suggested that patients with bipolar disorder 
recover their capacity for thinking about others as they move towards a euthymic mood state 
(Ioannidi et al., 2015). 
While there may be metacognitive deficits in bipolar disorder, there is reason to 
hypothesize that these are less severe than in schizophrenia. Tas et al. (2014) have compared the 
metacognitive functions of patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder and found that 
patients with schizophrenia have more severe deficits in some forms of metacognition (i.e., self-
reflectivity), but not others, and that the metacognitive deficits of both groups had a different 
pattern or correlation with neurocognitive function. The generalizability of this study was limited 
by the sample being composed of participants in a state of remission and the lack of a healthy 
control group needed to gauge the magnitude of deficits. A meta-analysis of studies looking at 
the related construct of social cognition found that overall patients with schizophrenia had more 
social cognitive deficits compared to patients with bipolar disorder, however there was 
significant overlap in terms of those deficits (Bora and Pantelis, 2016). Concerning 
  
 
metacognitive beliefs, studies have shown elevated levels of maladaptive metacognitive beliefs 
among patients with bipolar and unipolar depression which were associated with ruminations, 
and worry (Batmaz et al. 2014) as well as anxiety and depression (Sarisoy et al., 2014). 
 Understanding whether metacognitive deficits are present in bipolar disorder and differ 
in schizophrenia has several important implications. For one, if the metacognitive profiles of 
these disorders differ, then different treatment strategies may be called for; further, the 
confirmation of metacognitive deficits in bipolar disorder might point to the possibility of 
adapting clinical interventions which have shown promise for enhancing metacognitive capacity 
for patients with other conditions such as schizophrenia (Lysaker et al., 2015b) and personality 
disorders (Dimaggio et al., 2015; Vohs and Leonhardt, 2016; Buck et al., in press). 
To explore this issue, the primary aim of this study was to test whether there were 
differences in the metacognitive capacity of three groups: patients with schizophrenia, patients 
with bipolar disorder and healthy controls. We included two measures, which tap different 
domains of metacognition: the Metacognition Assessment Scale Abbreviated (MAS-A; Lysaker 
et al., 2005) which assesses the capacity to notice mental states, form integrated senses of self 
and others, to see the world as viewable from multiple perspectives and then to use that 
information in the face of psychosocial challenges, and the Metacognition Questionnaire (MCQ; 
Wells and Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) which assesses metacognitive beliefs, or beliefs related to 
worry, cognitive confidence and self-consciousness, and need for control. We included both 
these measures because each, as noted above, has been separately linked to outcome in 
schizophrenia. Further, each may differently affect outcome in either condition. Whereas more 
synthetic forms of metacognition may limit persons’ abilities to understand what they want and 
why they react as they do in dealing with psychosocial challenges, metacognitive beliefs or 
  
 
difficulties attending to attentional biases may result in heightened confusion, hyperarousal and 
worry, degrading function according to a different route. We predicted that patients with 
schizophrenia would exhibit the poorest levels of metacognition on both measures compared to 
patients with bipolar disorder and healthy controls and that the metacognitive function of patients 
with bipolar disorder would be more impaired relative to that of healthy controls. We reasoned 
this would be the case, given parallel findings that both psychosocial and social cognition 
deficits are greater in schizophrenia than in bipolar disorder and that social cognitive and 
psychosocial function of both groups is less than in persons with no psychiatric illness (Bora and 
Pantelis, 2016). 
The secondary aims of our study were to examine the symptom correlates of both 
measures of metacognition. Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that a lack of 
complex and integrated ideas about self and others may reduce the meaningfulness of daily 
experience resulting in reduced motivation and avolition (Buck et al., 2014). We predicted that 
lower levels of synthetic metacognitive function in the clinical groups would be related to 
negative symptoms. While negative symptoms in patients with bipolar disorder have not been 
nearly as widely studied as in schizophrenia, there is evidence that they represent a barrier to 
recovery for this group (Strauss et al.,  2016). By contrast, we predicted that dysfunctional 
metacognitive beliefs in the clinical sample would be related to higher levels of positive 
symptoms, anxiety and depression (Wells and Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). We reasoned that 
rumination with themes of worry and threat might activate a vicious cycle in which negative 
cognitions and affects would reinforce one another, potentially sustaining delusional ideas and 
hallucinations. 
  
 
Finally, we had the exploratory aim of examining whether the two measures of 
metacognition were associated with one another. Theoretically, while each taps a different part 
of the spectrum of metacognition, they might be expected to influence one another. For example, 
lower levels of synthetic metacognitive capacity might leave persons less able to notice and 
correct a maladaptive focus on worry, threat, or control. Alternatively, preoccupation with worry, 
threat or control may limit awareness of changes in mental states making it difficult to 
understand oneself and others in a complex nuanced manner. 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 72 adults diagnosed with bipolar disorder (n = 23), a schizophrenia 
spectrum disorder (n = 26), and a group of healthy control participants (n = 23). Both clinical 
samples were comprised of adults in a non-acute phase of illness and were recruited from two 
different outpatient psychiatric units and received medication and supportive counseling. The 
diagnosis was made according to the criteria of DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) by treating 
psychiatrists who had decades of experience in the treatment of psychotic patients. Further 
demographic information is included in Table 1. Exclusion criteria for the clinical samples were 
the presence of a disability or cognitive impairment, neurological disorders, drug addiction in the 
last month, hospitalizations or medication changes in the last month. The non-clinical sample  
were recruited through advertisements in local newspapers and underwent a short clinical 
consultation with a psychiatrist in order to exclude any major mental disorders, drug or alcohol 
addiction or neurological condition. 
 
2.2 Instruments 
  
 
2.2.1 Indiana Psychiatric Illness Interview (IPII; Lysaker et al., 2002). The IPII is a 
semi-structured interview that asks participants to describe their understanding of their mental 
illness and psychological challenges. The protocol for participants with vs. without mental illness 
differed somewhat from each other. First, all participants are asked to tell the story of their lives. 
Participants diagnosed with a mental illness were then asked whether they believed they have a 
mental illness, and about problems related to this, as well as how they felt about having a mental 
illness. The next set of questions concern how things may have changed since having a mental 
illness, such as cognitions, emotions, personality characteristics and psychosocial function. Next, 
participants with mental illness were asked about how they controlled their mental illness and in 
what ways it controlled their lives. Participants with mental illness were then asked how their 
condition both affects and is affected by others. Finally, participants are asked what may be the 
same or different for them in the future. Participants without a mental illness, were asked the 
same series of questions, however, by contrast, in place of being asked about a mental illness 
they were asked about an emotionally or psychologically challenging situation in the last several 
years. This involved asking them about problems related to an emotionally or psychologically 
challenging situation, as well as how they feel about having experienced this situation. The next 
set of questions concerned how things may have changed since this situation, such as cognitions, 
emotions, personality characteristics and psychosocial function. Next, participants without 
mental illness are asked about how they controlled that situation and in what ways it controlled 
their lives. Participants without mental illness were then asked how that situation both affects 
and is affected by others. Finally, participants are asked what may be the same or different for 
them in the future. Interviews are audiotaped at the time of the interview and are later transcribed. 
Interviews typically last for 30 to 60 minutes and are conducted by trained research assistants.  
  
 
2.2.2. Metacognition Assessment Scale-Abbreviated (MAS-A; Lysaker et al., 2005). The 
MAS-A is a rating scale used to assess metacognitive capacity as it pertains to the abilities to 
form complex and integrated representations of self and others. It was adapted on the basis of the 
original instrument, the Metacognitive Assessment Scale (Semerari et al., 2003) for use in 
studying metacognition in IPII transcripts and reconceptulized metacognitive function as existing 
along a spectrum (Lysaker et al., 2005) with lower levels involving lesser amount of integration 
and higher levels involving greater levels of integration. The MAS-A contains four scales: Self 
Reflectivity, which refers to the ability to think about oneself (scores range from 0 to 9); 
Awareness of the Mind of the Other, which refers to awareness of others’ mental states, such as 
thoughts and emotions (scores ranging from 0 to 7); Decentration, which refers to the ability to 
see the world from multiple perspectives (scores ranging from 0 to 3); and Mastery, which refers 
to the ability to use knowledge of self and others to respond to psychological challenges (scores 
range from 0 to 9). For all scales of the MAS-A, higher scores indicate the capability for 
performing more complex metacognitive acts. Evidence of reliability and validity includes have 
been reported elsewhere (Lysaker and Dimaggio, 2014). The MAS-A differs from other forms of 
metacognitive assessment in that it conceptualizes reflections about the self and others as 
involving a series of increasingly complex acts which vary according to the amount and types of 
information which can be integrated, rather than thinking of self-reflectivity and awareness of 
others as primarily a series of modular functions. 
2.2.3. Metacognitions Questionnaire-30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). 
The MCQ-30 is a shortened version of the Metacognitions Questionnaire and contains 30 items. 
It measures metacognitive beliefs that are implicated in a range of mental health conditions. The 
MCQ-30 is a self-report measure and yields five subscale scores and a total score, with subscales 
  
 
including: Positive Beliefs About Worry, Negative Beliefs about the Uncontrollability and 
Danger of Worry, Cognitive Confidence, Cognitive Self-Consciousness, and Need for Control 
(i.e., necessity of controlling one’s own thoughts). Responses are given on a 4-point Likert scale, 
ranging from do not agree to agree very much, and then sums of the subscales are combined for 
the total score. For all scores, higher values reflect more problematic metacognitive beliefs. 
2.2.4. Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Overall and Gorham, 1962; Conti et al., 
1999). The BPRS rates participants on a number of symptom domains. Each domain is rated on a 
scale of 1 to 7, with 7 denoting the highest level of severity. The 18-item version of the measure 
was used to derive five scales: Anxiety/Depression; Withdrawal/Retardation; Thinking 
Disturbance; Activation and Hostility and Suspiciousness. 
2.3. Procedures 
 All procedures were approved by the local ethics committee. Following informed consent 
and evaluation of inclusion and exclusion criteria, diagnoses were confirmed by senior clinicians, 
according to non-structured clinical interviews and after staff meetings. Participants completed 
the MCQ-30. The IPII was conducted by a trained interviewer with at least a doctorate in 
psychology. IPII interviews were later transcribed and then rated by trained raters who had 
received formal training of the MAS-A by one of the authors of the original MAS; they were 
blind to other test scores and did not conduct or transcribe the interview. The BPRS ratings were 
performed by trained raters with doctoral degrees in psychology. Ratings were performed blind 
to MAS-A scores. 
2.4 Data Analysis 
 Analyses were performed in four steps. First, we planned to compare the demographic 
characteristics of the three groups as well as symptoms measured using the BPRS. Second, we 
  
 
planned to compare groups on the MAS-A and the MCQ-30, controlling for potentially relevant 
covariates. Third, we calculated Pearson correlations to explore whether metacognition was 
related to symptoms. While we made predictions about the Withdrawal/Retardation, 
Anxiety/Depression, and Thought Disorder subscales of the BPRS, we examined the correlations 
of the other subscales for exploratory purposes. Additionally, given the number of planned 
correlations, we used two-tailed tests of significance despite making unidirectional predictions. 
Finally, we planned to calculate Pearson correlations of the MAS-A with MCQ-30 scales to 
explore the relationship between the two metacognition scales for the entire sample.  
3. Results 
 Mean scores for participant demographics and BPRS scores for the two clinical groups 
are reported in Table 1. As revealed in Table 1, ANOVA revealed that the schizophrenia 
spectrum group was significantly younger than the other groups while the control group had 
significantly more education than the other groups. The schizophrenia group also had higher 
levels of symptoms than the bipolar disorder group. In a follow-up analysis, differences in 
symptom levels persisted after we accounted for age differences between the groups.  
Given differences in ages and education, the variables were included in the next analyses 
when we compared groups on the MAS-A and MCQ-30. As revealed in Table 2, the 
schizophrenia group had significantly lower ratings of metacognitive capacity on all subscales 
and the total score of the MAS-A compared to the bipolar disorder and control groups. These 
differences persisted between the schizophrenia group and the bipolar disorder group after 
adding the BPRS total as an additional covariate. No significant differences were observed 
between the groups in the MCQ-30 subscales or total.  
  
 
 Next, we explored the relationship between metacognition and symptoms in the 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder groups separately using Pearson correlations. Groups were 
not combined given differences between groups on the BPRS and MAS-A. As revealed in Table 
3, higher MAS-A total scores were related to lower levels of the Withdrawal/Retardation BPRS 
scale for both clinical groups. For the schizophrenia group, Self-reflectivity and Awareness of 
the Mind of the Other were the subscales most closely related to negative symptoms while for 
the bipolar disorder group, Self-reflectivity and Mastery were the subscales most closely related 
to negative symptoms. A higher total score for the BPRS was related to higher levels of the 
MCQ-30 total score and the Need for cognitive control subscale for the bipolar disorder group. 
Greater thinking disturbance scores on the BPRS were significantly related to lower Self-
reflectivity scores on the MAS-A and higher Need for cognitive control on the MCQ-30 in the 
schizophrenia group. 
 Finally, Pearson correlations were calculated to assess the relationship of the MAS-A and 
MCQ-30 scores. As revealed in Table 4, the pattern of correlations suggested that, in general, 
higher MAS-A scores were significantly related to lower scores on the Need to control thoughts 
MCQ-30 subscale. A range of other more modest correlations was found for other subscales of 
these instruments, but did not appear to coalesce into a broader pattern. 
4. Discussion 
In this study we compared two forms of metacognitive functioning of patients diagnosed 
with a schizophrenia spectrum disorder, bipolar disorder and a group of healthy controls and 
explored whether metacognitive function was related to negative and disorganization symptoms 
in the clinical groups. As predicted, patients diagnosed with schizophrenia appeared less able to 
form complex ideas about themselves and others, to see the world from a decentered stance and 
  
 
to use metacognitive knowledge to respond to psychosocial challenges relative to the other two 
groups. Patients diagnosed with bipolar disorder appeared less able to form complex ideas about 
themselves and others, to see the world from a decentered stance and to use metacognitive 
knowledge  to respond to psychosocial challenges relative to the healthy control group.  
Concerning concrete differences between the clinical groups, the schizophrenia group 
was only partially aware of their own nuanced emotions and struggled to perceive discrete 
mental events in others. They could not see how events were unrelated to them, but were able to 
frame a plausible psychological problem without, however, any sense of how to respond to it. 
The patients in the bipolar disorder group, by contrast, were aware of their own nuanced 
emotions and the subjectivity of their thoughts but struggled to see the world as offering other 
than what they wanted. They struggled to perceive nuanced affects in others, yet they could 
imagine a world in which they were not the center, but not necessarily that events can be viewed 
from legitimately different perspectives. They were able to perceive how they faced a plausible 
psychosocial problem and in response, could adjust their behavior, but less so, their thinking. 
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that patients with bipolar disorder experience 
certain forms of metacognitive deficits, which are generally less severe than those found in 
schizophrenia (Tas et al., 2014; Bora and Pantelis, 2016). 
Also, as predicted, lower levels of the overall ability to form and use an integrated sense 
of mental states was related to higher levels of negative symptoms in both groups. This is 
consistent with other work suggesting that negative symptoms may arise from deficits in 
synthetic metacognitive abilities (e.g., Buck et al., 2014). Previous work also suggests the 
presence of negative symptoms in patients with bipolar disorder even without presence of 
psychotic symptoms (Strauss et al., 2016). For example, it may be that impairments in the 
  
 
abilities to make sense of mental states makes it more difficult for persons with bipolar disorder 
and schizophrenia to engage with the world resulting in finding withdrawal to be the most viable 
option. In patients with schizophrenia, social withdrawal seems to be directly related to the 
difficulty to construct a clear representation of the other’s mind, while in bipolar patients, social 
withdrawal may be more related to difficulties using metacognitive knowledge to respond to 
psychosocial challenges. There are alternative explanations, however, which cannot be ruled out 
including that the correlations found here reflect the influence of other phenomenon or that 
negative symptoms cause metacognitive deficits. 
Overall, metacognitive beliefs were also related to positive symptoms in the bipolar 
group with Cognitive control being related to positive symptoms in both groups. Consistent with 
earlier research (Morrison et al., 2011), it may be that the tendency to view one’s own thoughts 
as needing to be controlled is a risk factor for positive symptoms. It is also possible that for 
patients with both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, positive symptoms may lead persons to 
distrust their thoughts and to shift their focus to controlling those thoughts. Again, alterative 
explanations cannot be ruled out including that other factors are responsible for the observed 
relationships. 
There were unexpected findings. Metacognitive beliefs did not differ statistically between 
the three groups. This may suggest that in the more severe forms of mental illness disturbances 
in metacognitive beliefs are equivalent. This could be a reflection of our relatively modest 
sample size, however. While the MCQ total scores of the schizophrenia and bipolar group were 
virtually identical, they were a half standard deviation higher than the healthy controls. This may 
suggest that with a larger sample statistical differences between the clinical groups and controls 
might emerge. Metacognitive beliefs were not significantly linked with anxiety. As with all 
  
 
negative findings, however, speculation should be taken as tentative and fodder for future 
research. 
Results of our exploratory analysis also pose some potential questions for future research. 
In particular, the link between higher levels of overall metacognitive capacity and a lesser need 
to control individuals’ thoughts could suggest that persons are more likely to be fearful of 
thoughts as they emerge if they are less able to integrate mental activities in general into an 
integrated sense of the self and others. It is also possible that fearing that mental activities could 
derail functioning makes persons less likely to attend to and integrate information. Future 
research is needed to explore these questions further.  
There are limitations. Our sample size was modest and limited to patients involved in 
treatment. Analysis thus lacked power and replications is needed in larger samples. We did not 
assess duration of illness and there was an imbalance in the proportions of men and women 
between groups. Additionally, multiple correlations were performed and the risk of spurious 
findings increased. While raters were not told of participant’s status it might also have been 
apparent from the content of their IPII whether patient experienced mood elevations or 
disturbances in cognition.  This study was lastly cross-sectional in nature and future longitudinal 
research is needed to explore the causal relationships among the variables.  
With replication, there may be clinical implications. If patients with bipolar disorder 
experience metacognitive deficits, treatments which address metacognition in schizophrenia (e.g., 
Lysaker et al., 2015a; Lysaker and Klion, in press) could be tailored to assist this group. In 
particular, we anticipate that the tailoring of such treatments would take into account differences 
in metacognitive capacity between groups. For example, in addressing self-reflectivity for 
patients with Schizophrenia, group therapists might focus on understanding affect whereas for 
  
 
patients with bipolar disorder, therapists might address the disconnect between need and reality. 
Given links with symptoms, it may also be that treatments which enhance synthetic 
metacognition may affect negative symptoms, while by contrast, treatment that addresses 
metacognitive beliefs may affect positive symptoms. More research is needed to explore these 
possibilities. 
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 H
ig
h
li
g
h
ts
 
 S
er
io
u
s 
m
en
ta
l 
il
ln
es
s 
is
 l
in
k
ed
 w
it
h
 m
et
ac
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
d
ef
ic
it
s 
in
 m
et
ac
o
g
n
it
io
n
 
 M
et
ac
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
b
el
ie
fs
 a
n
d
 c
ap
ac
it
ie
s 
in
 s
ch
iz
o
p
h
re
n
ia
, 
b
ip
o
la
r 
d
is
o
rd
er
 a
n
d
 i
n
 h
ea
lt
h
y
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 w
er
e 
co
m
p
ar
ed
. 
 
 T
h
e 
sc
h
iz
o
p
h
re
n
ia
 g
ro
u
p
 h
ad
 p
o
o
re
r 
le
v
el
 o
f 
sy
n
th
et
ic
 m
et
ac
o
g
n
it
io
n
 t
h
an
 t
h
e 
b
ip
o
la
r 
g
ro
u
p
 w
h
ic
h
 h
ad
 p
o
o
re
r 
sy
n
th
et
ic
 m
et
ac
o
g
n
it
io
n
 
th
an
 h
ea
lt
h
y
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
. 
 N
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
w
er
e 
fo
u
n
d
 i
n
 l
ev
el
s 
o
f 
m
al
ad
ap
ti
v
e 
m
et
ac
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
b
el
ie
fs
 b
et
w
ee
n
 g
ro
u
p
s.
 
 
 
 
